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Abstract
This paper gives a philosophical assessment of the Montevideo interpretation
of quantum theory, advocated by Gambini, Pullin and co-authors. This interpre-
tation has the merit of linking its proposal about how to solve the measurement
problem to the search for quantum gravity: namely by suggesting that quantum
gravity makes for fundamental limitations on the accuracy of clocks, which imply
a type of decoherence that ‘collapses the wave-packet’.
I begin (Section 2) by sketching the topics of decoherence, and quantum
clocks, on which the interpretation depends. Then I expound the interpretation,
from a philosopher’s perspective (Sections 3, 4 and 5). Finally, in Section 6, I
argue that the interpretation, at least as developed so far, is best seen as a form of
the Everett interpretation: namely with an effective or approximate branching,
that is induced by environmental decoherence of the familiar kind, and by the
Montevideans’ ‘temporal decoherence’.
Keywords: Montevideo interpretation; quantum clocks; decoherence; Everett
interpretation
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2
1 Introduction
This paper gives a philosophical assessment of a recent proposed interpretation of
quantum theory, advocated by Gambini, Pullin and co-authors, and called by them
‘the Montevideo interpretation’. (So I will dub these authors ‘the Montevideans’.)
Although the interpretation is bound to be controversial, it has the merit of linking its
proposed solution to the measurement problem to the search for quantum gravity: in
short, by suggesting that quantum gravity makes for fundamental limitations on the
accuracy of clocks, which imply a specific temporal type of decoherence that ‘collapses
the wave-packet’. For it is surely a merit to link debate about quantum foundations to
the search for new physics, even speculative new physics.
I therefore begin by sketching the standard topics on which the interpretation de-
pends (Section 2). Then I expound the interpretation, from a philosopher’s perspective
(Sections 3, 4 and 5).1 Finally, in Section 6, I argue that the interpretation, at least
as developed so far, is best seen as a form of the Everett interpretation: namely with
an effective or approximate branching, that is induced by environmental decoherence
of the familiar kind, and by the Montevideans’ ‘temporal decoherence’.
2 The landscape
I introduce the measurement problem and quantum clocks, in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 re-
spectively. Then we will be ready for a prospectus about the Montevideo interpretation
(Section 2.3).
2.1 Collapse, Everett, decoherence—and gravity
I will recall the relevant aspects of the measurement problem, by briefly sketching:
the collapse of the wave-packet (Section 2.1.1), the Everett approach and decoherence
(Section 2.1.2), and how the problem may be altered by considering gravity (Section
2.1.3). Later, I will return to these aspects in more detail: the first three in Sections
4.1 and 5.2, and the last in Section 5.1.
1This interpretation has been developed in about a dozen papers over the last ten years. As I
see matters, the main ones are: Gambini, Garcia Pintos and Pullin (2010, 2011, 2011a), Gambini,
Porto and Pullin (2006, 2007, 2008), Gambini and Pullin (2007, 2009, 2009a). For the way in which
considerations of quantum gravity, especially the ‘problem of time’ in quantized general relativity,
have motivated the interpretation, cf. Gambini, Porto, Pullin and Torterolo (2009) and Gambini
and Pullin (2009a). But my summary will draw on just a few aspects of Gambini, Porto and Pullin
(2007), and Gambini and Pullin (2009, 2009a); where I would recommend a philosopher to begin their
reading. The papers are also available at a website: http://www.montevideointerpretation.org/.
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2.1.1 The collapse of the wave-packet
Let us begin with the orthodox—or at least, traditional and minimalist—approach
to securing that measurements have definite outcomes. ‘The collapse of the wave-
packet’ refers to an irreducibly indeterministic change in the state of a quantum system,
contravening the deterministic and continuous evolution prescribed by the Schroedinger
equation. Anyone who advocates such a collapse, as a bona fide physical process that
occurs to an isolated system, faces several questions. Three of the most pressing are
as follows. Under exactly what conditions does the collapse occur? What determines
the physical quantity (the basis) with respect to which it occurs? How does it mesh
with relativity? Good questions, which went largely un-addressed by quantum theory’s
founding fathers: but which in recent decades have been addressed by a great deal of
good work. Section 4.1 will mention one main line, the dynamical reduction programme
of Ghirardi and others.
2.1.2 Everett, decoherence and patterns
The Everett or many-worlds interpretation proposes to reconcile quantum theory’s
deterministic evolution of the quantum state with the apparent collapse of the wave
packet, i.e. with measurements having definite outcomes with various frequencies, by
saying that measurement processes involve a splitting of the universe into branches.
Obviously, this proposal has to face its own versions of the murky questions just men-
tioned: about the conditions under which a branching occurs, how we should under-
stand branching, and how branching can mesh with relativity. Murky indeed. So it
is hardly surprising that this interpretation has traditionally been regarded as vaguer
and more controversial than others. Thus Bell, in his masterly (1986) introduction to
interpreting quantum theory, wrote that it ‘is surely the most bizarre of all [quantum
theory’s possible interpretations]’ and seems ‘an extravagant, and above all extrava-
gantly vague, hypothesis. I could almost dismiss it as silly’ (pp. 192, 194).
But I submit since Bell wrote, Everettians have made major improvements to their
interpretation. In my opinion, there have been two main improvements relevant to our
purposes: which I will label “Decoherence’ and ‘Patterns’.2
2.1.2.1 Decoherence :
Although the fundamental ideas of decoherence were established in the early years (and
were clear to maestros such as Heisenberg, Mott and Bohm), detailed models were only
developed from about 1980; (Schlosshauer (2008) is an excellent recent survey).
2I set aside a third improvement, viz. various arguments justifying, from an Everettian perspective,
the orthodox (Born-rule) form of quantum probabilities. All three improvements have been developed
in many papers over the last twenty years. Some of the latest work is in Saunders et al. (2010), and
by Wallace (2012, 2012a). The first of these also contains penetrating critical assessments of all three
improvements by non-Everettians.
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Recall that ’decoherence’ means, broadly speaking, the diffusion of quantum co-
herence from the system to its environment. This is the fast and ubiquitous process
whereby, for appropriate physical quantities, the interference terms in probability dis-
tributions, that are characteristic of the difference between a superposition and a mix-
ture, diffuse from the system to its environment. In a bit more detail: at the end of
the decoherence process, the quantum probabilities for any quantity on the system are
as if the system is in one or other of a definite set of states. In many models of how a
system (such as a dust-particle) interacts with its environment (such as air molecules),
this set consists of coherent states: states which are sharply peaked for both position
and momentum, so that a system in any such state is presumably nearly definite in
both position and momentum. (But the distributions have enough spread so as to
obey the Uncertainty Principle’s veto on simultaneous precise values for position and
momentum.)
For our purposes, decoherence has two important features. The first is a kind
of imprecision. That sounds like a defect; but I shall maintain—especially later, in
Sections 4.1 and 6—that this imprecision is, for the Everettian, a merit. (Here I follow
in the footsteps of some avowed Everettians, such as Saunders and Wallace.) So I will
call this feature ‘flexibility’.
Thus we expect the classical physical description of the world to be vindicated by
quantum theory—but only approximately. Only some subset of quantities should have
definite values. And maybe that subset should only be specified contextually, even
vaguely. And maybe the values should only be definite within some margins of error,
even vague ones. Decoherence secures this sort of flexibility. For the selection of the
quantity that is preferred in the sense of having definite values (relative to a branch)
is made by a dynamical process—whose definition can be legitimately varied in several
ways. Three examples: the definitions of the system-environment boundary, and of
the time at which the interaction ends, and of what counts as a state being ’sharply
peaked’ for a quantity, can all be varied.
The second feature is that decoherence does not just by itself solve the measurement
problem. More precisely: it does not imply that the system is in one of the set of states
(typically coherent states). It implies only that the quantum probabilities are as if the
system were in one. Furthermore, the theory implies that the system is in fact not
in one of those states (on pain of contradicting the original hypothesis that the total
system-plus-environment is in a superposition, not a mixture). This feature is well-
known, and has been given various names, especially ‘the problem of outcomes’, ‘the
problem of improper mixtures’ (following a jargon of D’Espagnat) and the ‘the problem
of replacing ‘and’ by ‘or’ (following a jargon of Bell); (cf. my discussion of (Outcome)
in Section 4.1).
To put this feature vividly, in terms of Schroedinger’s cat: at the end of the de-
coherence process, the quantum state still describes two cats, one alive and one dead.
It is just that the two cats are correlated with very different microscopic states of the
surrounding air molecules. For example: an air molecule will bounce off a wagging
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upright tail, and a stationary downward one, in different directions! Since one’s overall
aim is to solve the measurement problem, this feature is usually considered a defect,
not a merit, of decoherence. But we will now see how the Everettians’ second main
development may turn it into a merit ...
2.1.2.2 Patterns :
The second development is the application to the problems of quantum ontology, es-
pecially Schroedinger’s cat, of the philosophical idea that the objects in ‘higher-level’
ontology, e.g. a cat, are not some kind of aggregate (e.g. a mereological fusion) of
lower-level objects, but are dynamically stable patterns of them, of a special type—
which type being spelt out by what we believe about objects of that kind. This idea is
often associated with “functionalism” in the philosophy of mind (e.g. Dennett 1991).
Some prominent Everettians, such as Saunders and Wallace, maintain that it snatches
victory from the jaws of defeat: the defeat, just mentioned, that decoherence appar-
ently does not by itself solve the measurement problem. The idea is that the final
quantum state’s describing two cats, one alive and one dead, is a matter of the state
encoding two patterns—and the description is entirely right.
This becomes a bit clearer if we adopt a specific representation of the quantum
state, for example position. Then, roughly speaking: the final state is a wave-function
on the cat’s classical configuration space, with two peaks: one peak over some classical
configurations each corresponding to a live cat, e.g. with a wagging upright tail, the
other peak over some classical configurations corresponding to a dead cat, e.g. with a
stationary downward tail. But in that case: according to the idea of cats as patterns,
the quantum state does indeed represent two cats.
In other words: we see that we should take the measurement problem to be solved
by exactly what decoherence secures: a final state describing a living cat and a dead
one. In brief: the philosophical idea of higher-level objects as patterns vindicates the
Everettian vision of a multiplicity of objects.
It is worth stressing (as Wallace, for one, does) that this line of thought is inde-
pendent of quantum theory’s details; and so it is also independent of its various weird
features (e.g. non-locality). The point is closely analogous to one which we all unhesi-
tatingly endorse for several other physical theories. Namely, theories in which states
can be added together to give a sum-state, while the component states are dynamically
isolated, or nearly so (i.e. do not influence each other). Examples include the theory
of water-waves, or electromagnetism. So, says Wallace, we should also endorse it in
quantum theory, and accept that there are two cats.
For example: the water in Montevideo harbour can get into a state which we
describe as, e.g. a wave passing through the harbour’s centre heading due West; or
into a state which we describe as a wave passing through the centre heading due North;
or into a state which is the sum of these. But do we face a ‘Montevideo water paradox’?
Do we agonize about how the Montevideo harbour water-system can in one place (viz.
6
the harbour’s centre) be simultaneously both Westward and Northward? Of course
not. Rather, we say that waves are higher-level objects, patterns in the water-system;
and that there are two waves, with the contrary properties, one Northward and one
Westward. Similarly for the electromagnetic field in a certain region, and e.g. pulses
of laser light travelling in different directions across it.
And similarly, says Wallace, about the quantum wave-functions defined on the
classical configuration space. There is a state with two cats, one alive and one dead.
And of course, there are also myriad other states, the vast majority of which do not
represent macroscopic objects (patterns!) which we might recognize (as cats or as dogs
or as puddles or as mud or ...)—or even sums of these.
2.1.2.3 Summing up :
Let me sum up these two developments, Decoherence and Patterns. Nowadays, some
Everettians propose to combine the physics of decoherence with the philosophical
(“functionalist”) idea that objects in ‘higher-level’ ontology are dynamically stable
patterns of lower-level objects. This suggests that the proverbial Schroedinger’s cat
measurement involves an approximate and emergent splitting, after which there really
are two cats (or two broad kinds of cat), since the total wave-function is peaked over
two distinctive kinds of pattern in the classical configuration space: the legs, tail and
body all horizontal, still and cool (‘dead’); and the legs and tail vertical, moving and
warm (‘alive’).
I think these Everettians would admit how hard it is to get one’s mind around
the central idea: the dizzying vision of decoherence processes yielding a continual, but
approximate and emergent, branching of the universe that:
(a): meshes fundamentally with relativity, so that there is no absolute time
ordering to the splitting; and
(b): is to be combined with almost all objects—not just macroscopic objects
like cats, tables and stars, but anything that classical physics successfully describes
as having a spatial trajectory etc.: for example, large molecules—being treated as
patterns; or better: being treated as the quantum state being peaked above such
patterns in a classical configuration space.
I said ‘some Everettians’, since I do not think there is unanimity among them.
One main question is to what extent they should try to make this dizzying vision
more precise in general terms, perhaps by finding a new mathematical language to
describing the emergent branching. Thus Deutsch, in the course of his striking appeal
(2010) to fellow-Everettians to stop defending the interpretation against accusations
and rivals, and instead explore the new physics that it promises to contain, admits
that the exploration will be very challenging, since no one has yet given a precise
mathematical descriptions of (even toy models of) this branching structure (2010, p.
546).
On the other hand, Saunders and Wallace (at least as I read them) do not think any
such precise description could, or should, be possible. Nor is it desirable: vagueness
7
about when branching occurs is a merit—recall the label ‘flexibility’. They draw an
analogy which may be helpful: between (a) times as understood in the ‘block-universe’
view of time suggested by relativity theory (also known in philosophy as: the ‘B-theory’
of time), and (b) worlds or branches as understood by the Everettian. Recall that the
advocate of the block-universe says:
(i): reality is four-dimensional, and slices across it are in principle arbitrary and
artefactual (especially in relativity theory, with no absolute simultaneity); but also
(ii): for describing the history of the universe—and in particular, in physics, for
doing dynamics—only a small subset of slices will be useful; though the criteria to
select that subset will be a bit approximate.
Then the proposed analogy is as follows. Similarly, the Everettian says:
(i’): the ‘slicing’ of reality by choosing a basis in Hilbert space is in principle arbi-
trary and artefactual; but also
(ii’): for describing the history of the universe—and in physics, for doing the approx-
imate and emergent dynamics of a world—only a small subset of bases will be useful;
though the criteria to select that subset will be a bit approximate (since decoherence
gives no absolute criterion for a system-environment split, or for when interference
terms are small enough).
In short: the analogy is between arbitary slicings of spacetime, and arbitrary choices
of basis in Hilbert space. Both are precise; in both cases, for doing dynamics, only a
small subset will be useful; in both cases, the criteria to select that subset will be a bit
approximate.3
So this is very much an open debate among the Everettians.4 But I can duck out
of pursuing it: for my purposes in assessing the Montevideans, it will be enough that
some Everettians maintain that the vagueness of the branching is a merit.
2.1.3 Gravity?
I will make two remarks about how considerations about gravity might contribute to
solving the measurement problem. Both are very programmatic and brief, reflecting
the fact that we do not have a satisfactory unified treatment of quantum theory and
gravity; nor even a consensus about what it would look like.5 But they are worth
making, to set the stage for the Montevideo interpretation.
First: in the controversies about what a quantum theory of gravity should look like,
one central and long-established theme has been the conflict between the way general
relativity treats space and time, namely as dynamical (variable, and interacting with
matter and radiation), and the way other theories, both classical and quantum, treat
3For more details, cf. Wallace (2001); or more briefly, Butterfield (2002, Sections 7 and 8).
4And of course, it echoes a wider debate about whether fundamental physical theories must be
precise. In this context, I recommend Kent’s (2010) critique of the Everett interpretation.
5For philosophical introductions of the issues involved, cf. e.g. Butterfield and Isham (2001), and
Rovelli (2006).
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them, namely as non-dynamical (also called: ‘fixed’ or ‘background’). Besides, in one
main approach to quantum gravity, viz. the quantization of canonical (i.e. Hamilto-
nian) formulations of general relativity, this conflict is especially striking, indeed severe,
as regards the treatment of time rather than space: and accordingly, it is called ‘the
problem of time’. Though I shall not pursue this problem, I should emphasize that
the Montevideo interpretation grew out of the Montevideans’ engagement with it. For
details, cf. e.g. Gambini, Porto, Pullin and Torterolo (2009) and Gambini and Pullin
(2009a).
Second: there are various proposals that gravity might help solve the measure-
ment problem. One example is Penrose’s proposal that gravity drives the collapse of
the wave-packet; or a little more precisely: that a sufficiently large difference in the
gravitational self-energy of two configurations of masses renders superpositions of such
configurations unstable. The Montevideans’ proposal will be different: the idea will be
that quantum gravity implies fundamental limitations on clocks. To set the stage, the
next Section briefly discusses quantum clocks.
2.2 Quantum clocks
The treatment of time in quantum theory is a large and controversial subject—though
fortunately, not as large and controversial as the measurement problem as a whole! But
in the last few decades, the situation has become clearer through the work of many
people on such topics as the time-energy uncertainty principle, and the conditions for
the existence of a time operator.6
To prepare for the later discussion, I need here only to sketch two themes about
quantum clocks. Both concern limits to their resolution, arising from uncertainty prin-
ciples. The first theme is elementary and general, and so I can give some details;
the second involves detailed arguments about how certain ideal clocks might be con-
structed, and I will just cite the results the Montevideans will appeal to. These themes
are:
(i): the time-energy uncertainty principle constrains the resolution of clocks, how-
ever they might be constructed: roughly, narrowness in the energy distribution worsens
the resolution of a clock;
(ii): applying uncertainty principles to certain ideal clocks implies that mass con-
strains the resolution: roughly, a lower mass worsens the resolution.
(i): The time-energy uncertainty principle:
I shall assume that here, ‘time’ refers to a dynamical variable of the quantum system,
whose value, especially expectation value, serves as a clock-pointer, i.e. to measure
time. Thus in principle, every non-stationary quantity A defines for any state ρ a
characteristic time τρ(A) in which 〈A〉 changes ‘significantly’. For example: if A = Q,
6Butterfield (2012) is a philosophical introduction, emphasizing the first topic, especially the work
of Busch, Hilgevoord and Uffink. For the whole subject of time in quantum theory, Muga et al. (2008)
is an excellent collection; for a glimpse of work since then, I recommend Yearsley (2011).
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and ρ is a wave packet, say ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, then τρ(A) could be defined along the lines:
the time for the bulk of the wave packet to shift by its width. This assumption is
not controversial. It corresponds to what Busch in his excellent survey (2008) calls
‘intrinsic time’ (and in his earlier (1990, 1990a), ‘dynamical time’).
With this notion of time, we can easily derive what is perhaps the best-known time-
energy uncertainty principle, the Mandelstam-Tamm principle. Namely, we define the
characteristic time for any quantity A by
τρ(A) := ∆ρA / | d〈A〉ρ /dt | (2.1)
and readily deduce (e.g. Messiah 1965, p. 320)
τρ(A)∆ρ(H) ≥ 1
2
~. (2.2)
An easy example is given by a free particle in a pure state ψ with a sharp momentum
i.e. ∆ψP << |〈P 〉ψ|. We can deduce that ∆ψQ(t) ≈ ∆ψQ(t0), i.e. the wave-packet
spreads slowly; so that the Mandelstam-Tamm time τρ(Q), as defined by eq 2.1, is
indeed the time it takes for the packet to propagate a distance equal to its standard
deviation.
But to discuss the resolution of a quantum clock, we need instead the example
of the lifetime of a property represented by a projector Pˆ . Let us define p(t) :=
〈ψ0|U−1t PˆUt|ψ0〉; where of course Ut := exp(−itH/~), so that p(t) is the probability of
“having” Pˆ at t. Then the Mandelstam-Tamm uncertainty relation gives
|dp
dt
| ≤ 2
~
(∆ψ0H)[p(1− p)]
1
2 . (2.3)
Integration with initial condition p(0) ≡ 1 (i.e. Pˆ actual at t = 0) yields
p(t) ≥ cos2(t(∆ψ0H) / ~) for 0 < t <
pi
2
~
(∆ψ0H)
; (2.4)
so that if we define the lifetime τPˆ of the property Pˆ as a “half-life”, i.e. by p(τPˆ ) :=
1
2
,
we deduce
τPˆ .∆ψ0H ≥
pi~
4
. (2.5)
The general point is that the rate of change of a property of the system decreases
with increasing sharpness of the energy: and in the limit of an energy eigenstate, all
quantities have, of course, stationary distributions.
It is straightforward to apply the Mandelstam-Tamm inequality eq. 2.5 to get a
lower bound on the resolution of a quantum clock. The general idea of such a clock
is that it is a sequence ψ1, ψ2, ... of orthogonal clock-pointer states that are occupied
at equi-spaced times t1, t2, ...; so the clock resolution is δt := tk+1 − tk. Thus suppose
the clock-pointer is the mean position of a wave packet. Then eq. 2.5, together with
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the constraint that the resolution be greater than the Mandelstam-Tamm time, i.e.
δt ≥ τψ(Q), implies
δt ≥ τψ(Q) ≥ pi~
4
1
∆ψH
. (2.6)
So the sharper the energy, the worse the resolution: more exactly, the higher is the
resolution’s lower bound.7
(ii): A constraint from mass:
There are some heuristic arguments that apply uncertainty principles (of position-
momentum, as well as time-energy) to certain ideal clocks (e.g. bouncing light between
two mirrors), and conclude that there are fundamental limits on the clocks’ resolution:
limits additional to those sketched in (i) above.
Thus in a famous analysis, Salecker and Wigner (1957) argued that the mass of a
clock limited its accuracy: specifically, if T is the time-interval to be measured by a
clock of mass M , then there must be an uncertainty δT proportional to
√
T/M . This
analysis suggests that one can attain arbitrary accuracy by a sufficiently massive clock.
But Ng and van Dam (1994) argued that in general the mass needs to be confined,
and that therefore the attainable mass, and so accuracy, is limited by the onset of the
formation of a black hole (!). I need not go into the details. Here it will suffice to say
that the Montevideans will endorse this line of argument (Section 5.1.1).
2.3 The road ahead
So much by way of sketching the landscape. From now on, I turn to assess the Mon-
tevideo interpretation of quantum theory. As I said in Section 1, the proposal is to
solve the measurement problem by combining decoherence (as in Section 2.1) with a
fundamental limitation on the accuracy of quantum clocks (as in Section 2.2) which is
suggested by some heuristic considerations about quantum gravity.
The plan is as follows. I will first summarize the Montevideans’ analysis of how, in
orthodox quantum theory, inaccurate clocks make for mixed quantum states (Section
3). Then I discuss these states’ interpretation, by comparison with the mixed states
obtained in two other approaches, viz. decoherence by the environment and dynam-
ical reduction (Section 4). In Section 5, I report the Montevideans’ main proposals:
that considerations about quantum gravity make for a fundamental limitation on the
accuracy of quantum clocks, which solves the measurement problem—in effect, by an-
swering objections that are made to the mixed states obtained by environment-induced
decoherence. Finally, in Section 6, I will urge that the Montevideo interpretation is best
seen as a version of the Everett interpretation, with an effective or approximate branch-
ing. It will be clear that the discussion becomes more controversial, as we proceed:
7There is a great deal more to say here, even without going into details about clocks’ construction
as the arguments cited in (ii) will do. For there is a large literature on various versions of the
time-energy uncertainty principle (Busch 2008): for example, Butterfield (2012) advertises how the
Hilgevoord-Uffink uncertainty principles have advantages over the usual ones.
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one can ‘get off the bus’ at various stops. That is: in the present state of theoretical
and experimental knowledge, the later proposals remain unproven—but nonetheless
interesting!
3 Evolution with respect to a real clock
The Montevideans’ first contribution is a natural sequel to Section 2.2. For it is an
analysis within orthodox quantum theory of what the phrase, ‘the probability of a given
outcome, for a measurement on a given state at a given time’, really means, when one
takes seriously that the ‘given time’ is as read by a quantum quantity. (This Section
summarizes part of Section II of Gambini, Porto and Pullin (2007), and follows their
notation.)
We envisage measuring a quantity Oˆ on a quantum system, when a quantity, Tˆ say,
on another quantum system (‘the clock’) has value ‘T ’. Both systems evolve in the
orthodox unitary (and non-interacting) manner with respect to the background time
t. We work in the Heisenberg picture (with respect to t), and allow for continuous
spectra. So the projector for the clock system for the value T lying in the interval
[T0 −∆T, T0 + ∆T ] is
PT0(t) :=
∫ T0+∆T
T0−∆T
dT Σk |T, k, t〉〈T, k, t| ; (3.1)
where: (i) the t in the bra and ket signal the use of the Heisenberg picture; (ii) k
represents the eigenvalues of some operators that together with Tˆ form a complete
set; and (iii) if the k have a partly continuous spectrum the sum over k should be
appropriately replaced by an integral.
Similarly the projector for the measured system for the value O lying in the interval
[O0 −∆O,O0 + ∆O] is
PO0(t) :=
∫ O0+∆O
O0−∆O
dO Σj |O, j, t〉〈O, j, t| , (3.2)
where j represents eigenvalues of operators that together with Oˆ form a complete set.
Then the (orthodox Born-rule) conditional probability that Oˆ takes value O0 given
that the clock indicates time T0 is
P(O ∈ [O0−∆O,O0+∆O]|T ∈ [T0−∆T, T0+∆T ]) =
limτ→∞
∫ τ
−τ dt Tr(PO0(t)PT0(t)ρPT0(t))
limτ→∞
∫ τ
−τ dt Tr(PT0(t)ρ)
(3.3)
where: (i) ρ is the (Heisenberg-picture, so t-constant) state of the combined system-
plus-clock; (ii) the integrals over all t on the right hand side reflect our ignorance
about when in the background time t the clock takes the value T0; (iii) we envisage
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that ∆T is chosen much smaller than any characteristic time scales of the problem (in
particular, the time-interval between successive measurements, if we were to consider
multiple measurements); and (iv) we envisage that Tˆ is so chosen that it does not take
the same value twice (at least in the lifetime of the experiment).
Our aim now is to relate this in-principle expression to the usual expression for the
Born-rule probability that Oˆ takes value O0 at time t: which is, in the more familiar
Schroedinger picture and an obvious notation:
P(O0|t) = Tr(PO0(0)ρ(t))
Tr(ρ(t))
. (3.4)
To this end, we now assume that the state is a product of the observed system and
the clock, and that they never interact. So ρ = ρsys⊗ ρcl and U = Usys⊗Ucl. Then the
conditional probability eq. 3.3 is equal to:
limτ→∞
∫ τ
−τ dt Tr(Usys(t)
†PO0(0)Usys(t)Ucl(t)
†PT0(0)Ucl(t)ρsys ⊗ ρcl)
limτ→∞
∫ τ
−τ dt Tr(PT0(t)ρcl)Tr(ρsys)
; (3.5)
which is equal to
limτ→∞
∫ τ
−τ dt Tr(Usys(t)
†PO0(0)Usys(t)ρsys)Tr(Ucl(t)
†PT0(0)Ucl(t)ρcl)
limτ→∞
∫ τ
−τ dt Tr(PT0(t)ρcl)Tr(ρsys)
.8 (3.6)
We now define
Pt(T ) := Tr(PT0(0)Ucl(t)ρclUcl(t)
†)∫∞
−∞ dt Tr(PT0(t)ρcl)
; (3.7)
which obeys
∫∞
−∞ dt Pt(T ) = 1, and represents a probability density of t at given T ;
(not ‘of T at given t’, despite the notation).
We also define an “effective” density matrix (of the observed system) as a function
of T , by
ρeff(T ) :=
∫ ∞
−∞
dt Usys(t)ρsysUsys(t)
†Pt(T ) . (3.8)
With these definitions, it is easy to verify, by noting that
Tr(ρ(T )) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dt Pt(T )Tr(ρsys) = Tr(ρsys) , (3.9)
8I thank Gordon Fleming for pointing out that in eq.s 3.3 to 3.6, one needs in general a ratio of
limits, so as to secure equality with the conditional probability on the left hand side of eq. 3.3. In
fact, Gambini et al (ibid.) write a limit of a ratio, i.e. one τ limit governing the ratio of two integrals:
which is of course equal to the ratio of limits, provided both numerator and denominator have a limit.
But I have followed Fleming’s correction, to respect the concept of conditional probability justifying
eq. 3.3.
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that the conditional probability eq. 3.6 is equal to
P(O0|T ) := Tr(PO0(0)ρeff(T ))
Tr(ρeff(T ))
: (3.10)
which is of the familiar form, as in eq. 3.4, except with the effective density matrix
ρeff(T ) substituted for the background-time density matrix ρ(t). Thus the definition of
ρeff(T ) makes eq. 3.6 take the familiar form eq. 3.4.
To sum up: the statistics we gather for the quantity Oˆ at the clock time T for
a system prepared at t = 0 in ρsys are given by a familiar-looking formula, viz. eq.
3.10: but one which uses the density matrix ρeff(T ) defined in eq. 3.8. Looking at
that definition, we infer: the statistics are as if the system is drawn from an ensemble,
whose components are (i) indexed by t ∈ IR, (ii) given by Usys(t)ρsysUsys(t)† and (iii)
weighted with the probability density Pt(T ) as given by eq. 3.7.
The physical idea is clear, and natural. Because the clock may be inaccurate, i.e. T
may be unequal to t, the statistics at a given T are a mixture of the orthodox statistics
associated with unitary evolutions to various times t, with the mixture’s weights being
given by Pt(T ), the probability density at given T of the component labelled t. Thus
the lab technician might report: ‘I measure O when the clock reads ‘T ’. But the
statistics of O that I gather are as if each measurement draws the system from an urn,
in the state Usys(t)ρsysUsys(t)
† with a probability Pt(T )dt’.
It is also clear that in terms of the clock-time T , evolution is not unitary: for
ρeff(T ) is a convex combination of density matrices, each of which is unitarily evolving
with respect to t, but which are associated with different values of t. This temporal
decoherence will be at the centre of the Montevideo interpretation.
The Montevideans write down the equation of motion for ρeff(T ) in terms of T ,
on the assumption that the clock is “good”, in the sense that the probability density
Pt(T ) takes the form
Pt(T ) = f(T − t) (3.11)
where f achieves a maximum at T = t, and has narrow spread (i.e. decays rapidly,
away from T = t). As one would guess, the equation (derived by considering a Taylor
expansion around t) is like the usual quantum Liouville equation for a Schroedinger-
picture density matrix, but with additional terms. I will not need its exact form;
(technically, it is a Lindblad equation, cf. e.g. eq. 14 of Gambini, Porto and Pullin
(2007)). But I do need a solution of it. Namely: if one assumes that the the distribution
f is symmetric and its width grows linearly with respect to clock-time T , then the
equation can be exactly solved; and if the system has a discrete energy spectrum, the
solution is
ρeff(T )nm = [ρeff(0)nm] exp(−iωnmT ) exp(−σω2nmT ) (3.12)
where: (i) ωnm := ωn−ωm ≡ (En−Em)/~ is the difference of the frequencies for levels
n and m; and (ii) σ is the (constant) rate of change, with respect to T , of the width of
f . Thus the off-diagonal terms go to zero exponentially.
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The first comment to make about the analysis just summarized is that it is clear
and uncontentious. For it is an orthodox quantum-theoretic analysis, with a natural
physical idea underlying its effective density matrix ρeff(T ). Besides, the Montevideans
note that some other analyses, with different motivations than theirs, get the same
or a similar result; and that the result successfully describes some real experiments
with appropriately ‘bad’ clocks Tˆ . But as one would expect, it is unclear and even
contentious how the mixture eq. 3.8, or its special case eq. 3.12, can contribute to
solving the measurement problem—cf. the next Section.
4 The meanings and roles of a mixture
In this Section, I will argue that the mixture in the general form, eq. 3.8, does not fulfill
the usual two roles for which a mixture is obtained, or hoped for, in approaches of the
quantum measurement problem; while on the other hand, the special case eq. 3.12 does
fulfill the first role. I will do this by first defining the roles, together with two familiar
approaches, viz. decoherence by the environment and dynamical reduction (Section
4.1). The situation for the Montevideans’ mixtures will then be clear, in Section 4.2.
I stress that this contrast, as to fulfillment of the two roles, will not be an objection
to Section 3’s analysis; nor even to the Montevideans’ proposed use of it to solve the
measurement problem. The basic reason why not is simply that the Montevideans
do not ask temporal decoherence to fulfill the usual two roles for a mixture. Rather,
they propose that it, especially the mixture’s special form eq. 3.12, answers objections
made to environment-induced decoherence—which they accept as playing a crucial
part in solving the measurement problem. This proposal, appealing to considerations
of quantum gravity, will be the topic of Section 5. But we will get a clearer view of the
proposal, by first spelling out this contrast about the two roles.
4.1 Two roles, two approaches and two debates
Thus consider the two roles that a mixture, obtained in an analysis of quantum mea-
surement, is usually taken as needing to fulfill. I give them obvious labels:
(Basis): To define a preferred quantity, or basis, or set of nearly orthogonal states:
and usually, one wants this quantity to be one that intuitively is definite at the end of
measurement (e.g. a quantity such as the position of the centre of mass of a pointer) .
This role—or the goal, or difficulty, of fulfilling it—is sometimes called ‘the preferred
basis problem’, or ‘the basis problem’.
(Outcome): To secure that in each specific measurement trial, there is an individual
outcome (represented mathematically by one component of the mixture). This role—
or the goal, or difficulty, of fulfilling it—is sometimes called ‘the problem of outcomes’;
or following d’Espagnat’s jargon (1976, Section 6.6), ‘the problem of interpreting the
mixture as proper (i.e. ignorance-interpretable) rather than improper (obtained by
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partial tracing)’; or following Bell’s jargon, ‘the problem of replacing ‘and’ by ‘or’.
(The Montevideans use all three labels.)
Broadly speaking, (Outcome) presupposes (Basis): only once a quantity or basis is
preferred, can one raise the question of securing one of the quantity’s values, or one of
the basis’ elements.
To illustrate what is at stake in fulfilling these roles, let us consider two familiar
approaches to the measurement problem—which, as mentioned, will help us to ‘locate’
the Montevideo interpretation. Again, I use labels:
(Ein): Decoherence by the environment, as studied by the Heidelberg school of Zeh
and co-authors, and the Los Alamos school of Zurek and co-authors; (cf. Giulini et al.
(1996), Schlosshauer (2008). My label ‘Ein’ abbreviates ‘einselection’, a word invented
by Zurek to convey ‘environment-induced superselection’.
(DRP): The dynamical reduction programme of Ghirardi, Rimini, Weber, Pearle
and others (begun, in large measure, by Ghirardi et al. (1986)). This programme
models the collapse of the wave packet (Section 2.1.1) as a physical process.
Without going into details, I first report what I take to be the literature’s consen-
sus, which the Montevideans (and I) endorse. Namely:
(Ein) fulfills (Basis): for decoherence selects a quantity like the position of the cen-
tre of mass of the apparatus pointer, in the sense that after the decoherence process,
the state of the apparatus and measured system is a density matrix that is nearly
diagonal in that quantity.
But (Ein) does not fulfill (Outcome). This is expressed in various ways by various
authors; cf. e.g. Giulini et al (1996, p. 37) and Leggett (2008). But the main point
is that since the density matrix has been obtained by tracing over the environment, it
represents an improper, not proper, mixture: there is no selection (even in some con-
ceptual sense) of one of its components as against the others. Indeed, the interference
terms, that are characteristic of the total system (including the environment) being in
a pure state (and thus symptomatic of the mixture being improper), can in principle
be revealed by measuring a suitable quantity on the total system (a ‘global quantity’).
(DRP), on the other hand, fulfills both (Basis) and (Outcome). It fulfills (Ba-
sis) by construction. For the revision of the Schroedinger equation explicitly exhibits
the quantity (typically defined in terms of position and mass-density) with respect to
which the final density matrix of the apparatus and measured system is nearly diag-
onal. And (Outcome) is fulfilled because this density matrix represents a proper, i.e.
ignorance-interpretable, mixture: for it has not been obtained by tracing over the en-
vironment. Besides, (DRP)’s scheme contains two other mathematical representations
of the individual outcome of a specific measurement trial: viz. a much higher ampli-
tude for that outcome than for the others, and an associated realization (also known
as: trajectory) of the postulated stochastic process which determines the outcome in
question; (whereas (Ein) has no such higher amplitude for a single outcome, and no
such stochastic process).
Agreed, that is a hasty summary. There are various debates about whether (Ein)
16
and (DRP) can succeed. To prepare for the Montevideans’ proposals in Section 5, I
need to note two such debates.
4.1.1 Can we ignore small amplitudes?
I just said that (Ein) and (DRP) each fulfill (Basis) by securing a final density matrix
of the apparatus and measured system which is nearly diagonal in a quantity that
intuitively one wants to be definite. But one common line of objection to (Ein) and
(DRP) presses the question: is ‘nearly’ good enough? The off-diagonal terms of the
density matrix may have a tiny modulus, but they are physically real.
Here we should distinguish three issues (and maybe more!). The first two apply,
I believe, to both (Ein) and (DRP); the third, usually called the ‘problem of tails’,
applies only to (DRP). I only need to state them: I will not need to pursue them
(thank goodness!).
(i): Revivals: In some models, after a very long time the off-diagonal terms become
large: so that whatever definiteness of the preferred quantity we had won by the end
of the measurement interaction turns out in the very long run to have been but a
temporary victory. This is called the problem of revivals (or ‘recurrence of coherence’,
or ‘recoherence’).
(ii): Which quantity?: One natural tactic for replying is to say that we should not
be dogmatic ab initio about exactly which quantity is to be secured as definite, in order
to solve the measurement problem. We should be flexible: if calculations suggest that
a quantity different from the one we at first wanted definite, but in some sense close to
it, is definite—then we should be satisfied with that. Thus suppose the density matrix
at the end of the measurement interaction is nearly diagonal in the quantity, Qˆ say,
that we at first wanted definite, but is exactly diagonal in a quantity Qˆ′, with Qˆ′ and
Qˆ suitably close (say, in operator norm). Then that is surely good enough: at least for
early times—since we must admit this tactic does not answer the problem of revivals.
(iii): Tails: Finally, small-amplitude terms have been taken as an objection to
(DRP)’s claim to have fulfilled (Outcome) by the final state having a much higher
amplitude for some single outcome than for the others. Thus some people object
that a possible outcome having a large, rather than tiny, amplitude is no rationale for
deeming it, rather than the other outcomes, to have occurred. Why not say instead
that any outcome with a non-zero, albeit tiny, amplitude occurs? (This is called the
problem of tails.)
4.1.2 Is vagueness a virtue or a vice?
Section 4.1.1’s debate about small amplitudes is part of a larger debate about whether
a solution to the measurement problem must make an absolutely precise statement
about which quantities on which systems have definite values (and with which proba-
bilities).
On the one hand, the tactic (ii) in Section 4.1.1 suggests we can be, even should
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be, flexible. Thus we require a solution to the measurement problem to vindicate the
classical physical description (‘the appearance of a classical world’, as it is sometimes
put)—but only approximately. Only some subset of quantities should have definite val-
ues. And maybe that subset should only be specified contextually, even vaguely. And
maybe the values should only be definite within some margins of error, even vague
ones. Clearly, (Ein) secures this sort of flexibility. For the selection of the preferred
quantity is made by a dynamical process—whose definition can be legitimately varied
in several ways. Three examples: the definitions of:
(a) the system-environment boundary (and therefore of what exactly is the inter-
action hamiltonian), and of
(b) the time at which the interaction ends, and of
(c) what counts as a state being ’sharply peaked’ for a quantity,
can all be varied. Of course, item (c) echoes Section 4.1.1’s debate about small ampli-
tudes. And (DRP) shares with (Ein) the flexibility about defining (b) and (c); but not
(a), since it makes no system-environment split.
On the other hand, there is a strong impulse to require precision; for (at least) two
reasons. First: over the eight decades since the measurement problem was first artic-
ulated, many proposals for how to solve it have been vague in ways that undermined
the proposal: the vagueness amounted to hand-waving (as the writings of Bell often
lamented). Second: most philosophers construe vagueness as semantic indecision. That
is: our words and concepts being vague is a matter of our not having decided on a pre-
cise boundary between instances and non-instances—and not a matter of reality itself
being vague (a notion which may well not be coherent). Most philosophers also take
mathematics to be precise, i.e. not vague. They also take physics to be in large part
precise, often because it is expressed in mathematical language. And where it is not
precise (as in much heuristic physics), they take it nevertheless to aspire to precision.
So they would naturally require quantum theory, in purporting to be a fundamental
theory, to give, or aspire to give, a precise i.e. non-vague solution to its measurement
problem.
I will return to this debate, and my own take on it, in Section 5.
So much by way of summarizing, partly in preparation for Section 5: the two usual
roles for a mixture, how the two approaches (Ein) and (DRP) treat those roles, and
the debates about their treatments. In the light of those debates, I should perhaps
weaken what I called ‘the literature’s consensus’ about these approaches’ fulfilling the
roles, and speak only of aims. That is: a more cautious summary would be to say just
that (Ein) aims to fulfill (Basis), but does not aim to fulfill (Outcome); while (DRP)
aims to fulfill both (Basis) and (Outcome).
In any case, this summary is enough for my purposes. For we can now check whether
the Montevideo interpretation’s temporal decoherence mixtures, eq. 3.8 and eq. 3.12,
fulfill the roles (Basis) and (Outcome).
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4.2 Montevideo’s mixtures
I begin with the first, general form, eq. 3.8. Clearly, it does not fulfill the roles (Basis)
and (Outcome). As to (Basis), eq. 3.8 does not suggest an orthogonal, or nearly
orthogonal, decomposition of ρ(T ) even if the initial state ρsys is pure (given as |ψ〉〈ψ|).
For of course typical components labelled by different values of t, Usys(t1)ρsysUsys(t1)
†
and Usys(t2)ρsysUsys(t2)
†, will not be orthogonal. Looking ahead for a moment: this
aspect will remain when, in Section 5, we ‘throw away the ladder’ of assuming a
background time t.
As to (Outcome), the situation is a little subtle. I said that (Outcome) presupposes
(Basis): so since (Basis) is not fulfilled, (Outcome) can hardly be. But on the other
hand, I stress that since we are at present assuming that there is a background time t,
each individual system measured at clock time T has in fact a time t: i.e. has in fact
persisted from the initial time t = 0 to a time t, at which it is measured for O and the
clock says ‘T ’ (with maybe T 6= t!). In short: though the value of t does not deserve
the name ‘outcome’ (which presumably should here be reserved for entities correlated
with values of the quantities Oˆ and Tˆ ), this value is perfectly definite in each specific
measurement trial. But as one would guess: this ‘definiteness of t’ will disappear when,
in Section 5, we ‘throw away the ladder’ of assuming a background time t.
I turn to the special case, eq. 3.12. This is nearly diagonal in a basis that is of
central physical significance, the energy basis. So the situation is obviously similar to
that which occurs in decoherence by the environment. That is: eq. 3.12 fulfills the
first role, (Basis). It selects energy as the preferred quantity: of course, modulo the
debate in Section 4.1.1, about whether we may ignore small amplitudes—in particular
the problem of revivals. And eq. 3.12 does not fulfill, and does not aim to fulfill, the
second role, (Outcome): no component of the mixture is selected.
In the light of this discussion, it is natural to ask how if at all the Montevideo
interpretation will fulfill (Basis) and (Outcome). As I see matters, the short answer—
to be expanded in Sections 5 and 6— is as follows.
As to (Basis): The interpretation appeals to a combination of (Ein) and temporal
decoherence, in the specific form of eq. 3.12. More specifically, temporal decoherence is
proposed as solving the problem of revivals that besets (Ein)’s fulfillment of (Basis); (cf.
Section 4.1.1). The idea will be that temporal decoherence makes revivals unobservable
in principle, not merely in practice.
As to (Outcome): The situation is less clear to me. To explain this, I should
distinguish two aspects of (Outcome) which I so far have not needed to separate:
(i) justifying the ascription of a proper (i.e. ignorance-interpretable) mixture;
(ii) justifying the ascription to an individual system of a single component of
such a mixture.
As I see matters, the Montevideans succeed in (i). They give details about how
temporal decoherence, especially eq. 3.12, answers the usual ‘global quantity’ objection
that, as mentioned in Section 4.1, prevents (Ein) fulfilling (Outcome). Their idea will
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be similar to their idea just above, for (Basis): temporal decoherence makes the global
quantity unmeasurable in principle, not merely in practice.
But what about (ii): securing an individual outcome in each specific measurement
trial? Here, I think the situation is less clear. I myself think their interpretation fits
best in an Everettian picture, for reasons to do with the vagueness debate of Section
4.1.2. But some of their remarks suggest they disagree. But as I mentioned, Sections
5 and 6 will expand on this.
5 Throwing away the ladder
The title refers to Wittgenstein’s metaphor of throwing away a ladder once one has
climbed it to gain an understanding. Here, the ladder is the background time t: and
nowadays the various research programmes seeking a quantum theory of gravity make
rival proposals for how to throw away this ladder. As mentioned in Section 2.1.3,
the Montevideans work in one such programme, viz. quantum general relativity; but
the Montevideo interpretation does not depend on its details. We can state their
interpretation as five proposals. The first four proposals are treated in Section 5.1.
The fifth proposal is separated out, in Section 5.2, since it leads in to Section 6’s
concluding suggestion that the Montevideo interpretation is best seen as Everettian.
5.1 Four proposals
The Montevideans propose that:
(i): Some heuristic arguments about black holes suggest that there are fundamental
limits to how accurate a quantum clock can be, so that the temporal decoherence of
Section 3 cannot be completely eliminated.
(ii): The equation of motion in terms of a clock-quantity T for a clock that is as
accurate as possible should be taken as fundamental. This is the ‘throwing away of the
ladder’ of background time t. So the ineliminable decoherence is now a fundamental
or principled type of decoherence.
(iii): This fundamental decoherence, together with environmental decoherence,
solves the quantum measurement problem, along the lines given in Section 4.2.
(iv): Besides, although the arguments in (i) vary somewhat in the accuracy limits
they suggest, the ensuing solution to the measurement problem is robust: it holds good
if one adopts the other accuracy limits.
I will present (i)-(iv), in order (Sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.4). But my discussion will be
much briefer than in Sections 3 and 4. This reflects not just lack of space: also, the
authors’ arguments are more heuristic; and so my own grip on them is more tentative.
These technicalities will lead in to the Montevideans’ final interpretative proposal,
about under what exact conditions ‘the wave-packet collapses’ (Section 5.2)—which
will prompt me to suggest in Section 6 that the interpretation fits best in an overall
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Everettian approach.
5.1.1 Heuristic arguments
As I announced in (ii) of Section 2.2, the Montevideans endorse arguments by various
authors, especially Salecker and Wigner, and Ng and van Dam, suggesting fundamental
limits on quantum clocks. Thus Salecker and Wigner argued that the mass of a clock
limited its accuracy: specifically, if T is the time-interval to be measured by a clock of
mass M , then there must be an uncertainty δT proportional to
√
T/M (1957, pp. 572-
574; cf. also Wigner (1957, pp. 260-61)). This suggests that one can attain arbitrary
accuracy by a sufficiently massive clock.
But Ng and van Dam (1994) argued that in general the mass needs to be confined;
and that therefore the attainable mass, and so accuracy, is limited by the onset of the
formation of a black hole. According to their analysis:
(a) if T is again the time-interval to be measured, the maximum attainable mass
is given by the mass of a black hole whose Schwarzschild radius is the distance light
would travel in T ; and
(b) the corresponding maximum attainable accuracy is given by an uncertainty δT
proportional to T
2/3
PlanckT
1/3, where TPlanck = 10
−44 seconds is the Planck time. So for
typical laboratory times of a few hours, δT ∼ 1016TPlanck ∼ 10−28 seconds. This is not
now experimentally measurable, but in principle it could be observed.
This analysis remains heuristic, indeed apparently controversial; (cf. the exchange
between Baez and Olson (2002) and Ng and van Dam (2003)). But the Montevideans
endorse this kind of analysis: taking heart from the fact (Section 5.1.4) that their
solution to the measurement problem seems insensitive to what are the exact limits on
clocks’ accuracy.
5.1.2 Fundamental decoherence
Prompted by the arguments in Section 5.1.1, the Montevideans propose to dispense
with the time t that formed the background of Section 3’s analysis: the fundamental
equation of motion is to be their equation of motion in terms of T , the clock-quantity
for a maximally accurate clock.
Or rather, to be precise: they take the arguments in Section 5.1.1 to suggest that the
unknown theory of quantum gravity, whatever its exact form, will yield their equation of
motion using this T , as the effective equation of motion governing a regime, whose exact
definition we of course cannot give (being ignorant of the quantum gravity theory!)—
but which we expect to include all the successful applications of quantum theory, both
non-relativistic and relativistic, “away from” quantum gravity effects such as might
occur in black holes.9
9Like almost all the literature on decoherence, the Montevideans’ analyses look non-relativistic;
21
This proposal implies that attention focusses on Section 3’s exact solution to their
equation, for a system with discrete energy levels, eq. 3.12, but now with the width
σ(T ) given as
(
TPlanck
T
)1/3
.TPlanck, i.e.
ρeff(T )nm = [ρeff(0)nm] exp(−ωnmT ) exp(−ω2nmT 4/3PlanckT 2/3) . (5.1)
5.1.3 Fundamental decoherence allied with environmental decoherence
We can now sketch how eq. 5.1 is meant to supplement the process of environmental
decoherence (called (Ein) in Section 4.1), so as to solve the measurement problem. As I
announced in Section 4.2, the idea is that this fundamental temporal decoherence kills
the off-diagonal terms of the density matrix of the macroscopic apparatus (together
with the measured system). In particular, this solves:
(i): the problem of revivals, i.e. the fact that in some models without temporal
decoherence, the off-diagonal terms can in principle, in the very long run, become large.
(In terms of Section 4.1.1’s debate about small amplitudes: this problem confronts
(Ein)’s fulfillment of the role (Basis).)
(ii): the problem of global quantities, i.e. the fact that in some models without
temporal decoherence, one can in principle measure a quantity whose statistics reveal
the total system, including the environment, to be in a pure (entangled) state. (In
terms of Section 4.1: this problem confronts (Ein)’s fulfillment of the role (Outcome).)
Here is a bit more detail about (i); (I set aside (ii), for which the discusssion is
similar). The general idea is that without temporal decoherence, an off-diagonal term
is a product of N complex numbers of unit modulus exp(i(θkt+ak)), k = 1, ..., N , where
N represents the number of degrees of freedom of the apparatus (and measured system),
and so is typically very large, and the phases ak are randomly distributed. Because
N is large, the common period of oscillation for the terms is very long, maybe even
comparable with the age of the universe—yet nevertheless finite. But when we include
temporal decoherence in the calculation, there is an extra exponential suppression.
Thus one detailed analysis (Gambini, Garcia Pintos and Pullin, 2010, Sections IV-V)
studies a spin model of Zurek’s, and a more realistic modification of it. Owing to the
temporal decoherence, the off-diagonal terms get multiplied by an N -fold product of
exponentials whose exponents are proportional to T 2/3. Putting in the figures for the
models, this gives unobservably small tails, and so no revivals even in very long times,
even for N between 100 and 1000.
5.1.4 Robustness
In Section 5.1.1, I reported that heuristic arguments suggest that the most accurate
clock has an uncertainty δT proportional to T
2/3
PlanckT
1/3. Here we should note that the
but one can imagine generalizing them to get an explicit Lorentz-invariance. Recall Section 2.1.3’s
contrast between general relativity’s treating time as dynamical, and quantum theory’s treating it as
‘background’, as in the cousin classical, Newtonian or special-relativistic, theories.
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Montevideans admit that some arguments suggest instead that δT ∼ T 1/2PlanckT 1/2.
But this makes essentially no difference to their conclusions, or even to their quan-
titative results in Section 5.1.3, about their proposed solution to environmental deco-
herence’s problems of revivals and global quantities. For provided that the uncertainty
in time goes as a positive power of T , one loses coherence. And quantitatively, as
regards the solution to the problem of revivals, reported in Section 5.1.3: if one were
to postulate more cautiously that the uncertainty goes like a small positive power, i.e.
δT ∼ T 1−εPlanckT ε for some small ε, then the only effect would be that the value of N
required to prevent revivals even in very long times would be raised from N ∼ 100 to
about N/(3ε).
5.2 The fifth proposal: about exactly when is there an out-
come
So much by way of reporting the four proposals. At this point, one naturally wants to
press the following straightforward point:
Temporal decoherence involves exponentials: its suppression of interference
is by dictating that exponential factors should multiply the terms that in
environmental decoherence remain troublesome. So the trouble persists.
That is: the terms remain, generically, non-zero for arbitrarily large times
etc. So, presumably, the wave-function does not in fact collapse. More
precisely: these four proposals have not secured that in each specific mea-
surement trial, there is an individual outcome. In short: we have not yet
passed from Bell’s ‘and’ to his ‘or’.’ To put the point in Section 4.1’s jargon
about the roles that a mixture might fulfill: the four proposals have not
fulfilled the role (Outcome).)
The Montevideans are of course aware of this point. In answer, they make the following
interpretative proposal, which completes their exposition. (At least: it completes it, in
the order of exposition I have adopted in this paper.)
They say: there is transition from ‘and’ to ‘or’—an individual outcome, a selection
of a single component of the mixture, an event—exactly when it becomes in principle
undecidable (thanks to fundamental temporal decoherence) whether or not the evolu-
tion of the total system is unitary. Here, philosophers will find the word ‘undecidable’
reminiscent of logic and computability theory; but these connotations are not intended.
All that is intended is just that no measurement of any quantity, even in principle, can
ascertain whether the evolution is unitary. Thus for a statement of this proposal, cf.
Gambini, Garcia Pintos and Pullin (2010, Section III and Appendix 2.A), Gambini
and Pullin (2009: replies to questions 10 and 11). They develop the proposal in more
detail, for their modification of Zurek’s spin model (mentioned at the end of Section
5.1.3), in Gambini, Garcia Pintos and Pullin (2011, Sections 3-5). I will not enter into
details, but just make two points: the second leading in to Section 6.
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First: this last discussion builds on some remarkable in-principle limitations on
measuring spins proposed by Kofler and Brukner (2010). Second: nevertheless, the
undecidability proposal about exactly when is the collapse, remains, in the Montev-
ideans’ publications so far, tied to specific models—prompting the question ‘What is
their exact and general proposal?’
6 Everett en fin
Here, I suggest, we see at last that the Montevideo interpretation fits best in an Ev-
erettian approach, in which a ‘branching’—in the above jargons: a transition from
‘and’ to ‘or’, an outcome, a selection, an event—is effective and approximate. And this
returns us (as I promised) to the debate in Section 4.1.2, about whether vagueness is
a virtue or a vice.
For of course, in the usual Hilbert space formalism, any pure state and any mixed
state are distinguished by the statistics, according to the Born rule, of some self-adjoint
operator or other. So a rigorous statement of undecidability in the Montevideans’ sense
would involve, just as a matter of logic, a rigorous statement of what is the proposed
restriction on quantities: which the Montevideans have not so far given.10
Thus as I see matters, the Montevideans face a strategic choice in developing their
interpretation:
(1): If they feel obliged to make such a statement: then their interpretation, though
undoubtedly already of great interest, is not yet complete. Of course, incompleteness
is no discredit: especially since one might think we should wait for the heuristic grav-
itational arguments in Section 5.1.1 to be made rigorous and-or to be extended, so as
to fill out the arguments of Sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.
(2): If they do not feel so obliged: then this should be—I suggest—because they
view such vagueness as a virtue, not a vice.
And as discussed in Section 4.1.2, such vagueness is indeed a virtue on an Everettian
approach, according to which the ‘branching’ is phenomenological or effective in physi-
cists’ sense. That is: branching is an approximation whose value does not depend
on its being precisely defined—indeed, the value depends on its not being precisely
defined. We saw there how environmental decoherence secured the desired flexibility
about which quantities have definite values, by its flexibility in the definitions of:
(a) the system-environment boundary,
(b) the time at which the decohering interaction ends, and
(c) what counts as a state being ‘sharply peaked’.
We can now add that the Montevideans’ temporal decoherence has similar flexibility
about (b) and (c). Thus I suggest that if the Montevideans choose (2), then their
10Though this sort of rigorous statement is often made by those adopting the algebraic approach
to quantum theory, such statements can of course be made using the Hilbert space formalism: which
is the formalism the Montevideans adopt.
24
interpretation fits best with an Everettian picture of ‘effective branching’.
Think of how valuable we find it to describe the region where a river meets the
sea in terms of a delta composed of islands and channels. We do not need to decide
what precisely counts as a channel, or a fork in the waterway. Indeed the description
is more valuable precisely because we do not decide: to give precise definitions would
be a waste of time, and would make our language and thought prolix and inflexible,
and so less adaptable to the demands of a passing occasion. The helmsman who asks
‘Shall I take the left or the right channel?’ would be annoyed to be told ‘It depends
on how one defines ‘main channel”.
But in closing, I stress that my overall aim here has been, not to object to the
interpretation—but to praise it! It has the merit of bringing specific, albeit heuristic,
considerations of quantum gravity to bear on the measurement problem. So I invite
the reader to explore it.
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